ISPI - Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale

04/24/2024 | Press release | Archived content

Oman’s Sultan Goes to the UAE: Why it Matters Also to the US and China

Oman relaunches bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), thus strengthening its position as infrastructural hub across the regions. On April 22, 2024, the Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tariq Al Said visited the UAE to discuss with the Emirati president Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (also known as MbZ) about bilateral, regional and international issues. The visit was remarkable for three reasons. First of all, it was the first-ever visit of the Sultan to the Emirati federation since he ascended to the throne in 2020 (MbZ visited Oman in 2022); secondly, Oman and the UAE boosted relations after a problematic political season; thirdly, expanded infrastructural cooperation between Omanis and Emiratis raises Oman's role in trade corridors, in the framework of the US-China strategic competition.

Oman and the UAE: A New Political Season Has Started

In the 2010s, diplomatic relations between Oman and the UAE weren't so friendly as throughout their history. In fact, the Emirati military-centred foreign policy was at odds with the Omani traditional, ´third way` approach to crises, driven by dialogue. The Iranian and, most of all, the Yemeni files played a significant role in straining Omani-Emirati relations. Abu Dhabi deployed troops in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led Coalition against the Houthis, also performing military-build up in Mahra (2016-18), a governorate bordering with Omani and traditionally under its political influence; conversely, Muscat kept a neutral profile during the 2015 war, facilitating diplomatic exchanges between Yemeni parties and regional powers. With regard to Iran, the UAE withdrew the ambassador from Teheran (2016-2022), while Oman cultivated good neighbourhood ties with the Islamic Republic as both are guardians of the Hormuz Strait.

Regional tensions also resulted into direct skirmishes. In 2018, as many Emirati nationals were buying border properties in Oman, Sultan Qaboos banned non-Omani citizens from owning agricultural land and real estate proprieties in strategic border areas, including Musandam (the Omani enclave in the UAE), and Dhofar (except for the port city of Salalah); in 2019, a second alleged UAE spying cell comprising Emirati citizens was sentenced to jail in Oman (the first was discovered in 2011). But things rapidly evolved since 2019, favouring the restoring of warm Oman-UAE relations. The death of Sultan Qaboos in early 2020 temporarily coincided with the recalibration of the Emirati foreign policy towards an economy-first model, triggered by the rise of uncontrolled political tensions in the Middle East.

"Deep and Longstanding Bonds"

In his Emirati visit, the Sultan was accompanied by a large delegation, also comprising the deputy prime minister for foreign affairs Shihab bin Tarik Al Said (his brother), and Bilarab bin Haitham Al Said, the youngest son of the Sultan; his other son, and heir, Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said (who is the minister of culture sports and youth), already visited the UAE in December 2023.

During the official meeting, the Omani Sultan and the Emirati President witnessed the signing of several agreements of 35 billion dollars worth regarding renewable energy and sustainability, technology, education and railways.

Infrastructures: How (Much) Foreign Policy Weighs

Infrastructures stand at the core of the new Omani-Emirati political season, and bilateral projects can also be linked to greater corridors. In 2022, Oman and UAE established the Oman and Etihad Rail, a 3 billion dollars joint venture project to develop and operate a railway network linking the port of Sohar, in the north of Oman, to Abu Dhabi, launching now a shareholding partnership between Etihad Rail, Mubadala and Omani Asyad Group Company. The company also signed a memorandum with Al Jazeera Steel Products Co (AJSP), an Oman-based manufacturer of steel products: the goal is to develop logistics for transporting raw materials and finished goods.

Linking Omani commercial ports, not only with the interior of the Sultanate but also with trade-oriented countries like the neighbour UAE, is going to incentivize Oman's role in wider connectivity networks. Since 2018, the Sultanate is part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) while, differently from the UAE, it hasn't been involved in the US-led India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project so far. In the IMEC case, foreign policy can make -and be- the difference: Oman is not expected to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel soon, although Muscat was the first GCC country to host the visit of an Israeli prime minister in 2018.

The Sultanate has taken a firm position about Israel, a stance that Sultan Haitham's reign has contributed to make tougher. Among the GCC states, Oman spent the hardest words against the Israeli government and the war in Gaza, strengthening the traditional pro-Palestinian position. Oman's Permanent Representative to the Arab League, Abdullah Al-Rahbi, went further saying that October 7 -the Hamas' attack against Israel- was "resistance to occupation". At the Omani Shura Council, an amendment to expand the existent 1972 Israel boycott law was approved by lawmakers in 2022, an initiative also supported by the Grand Mufti. However, Oman decided to open its airspace to Israeli flights on February 2023, few months later Saudi Arabia did the same; flights over Oman stopped later due to the conflict in Gaza as war-time precaution.

The Red Sea Crisis Affects Even Omani Ports

The Sultan of Oman and the UAE President also discussed about the enduring instability in the Southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, due to the Houthis' attacks against shipping. From a commercial perspective, the Sultanate is directly affected by the crisis, since Salalah (Dhofar) is the first major port of call for ships coming from the Gulf of Aden towards the Indian Ocean, with a 22% of decline in container volume recorded in December 2023, persisting in the first quarter of 2024. This adds to recurrent attacks by Iran to vessels in the Hormuz Strait and the Gulf of Oman (as the hijacking of an Israeli-linked vessel in Hormuz on April 13, 2024), resulting into an expansion of the maritime risk area till the Omani port of Sohar.

Trying to cope with volume contraction in Salalah, Oman is now adapting to transport offloaded cargo via road in the GCC area; a ´land alternative` similar to the corridor the UAE has been using now to connect -through Saudi Arabia and Jordan- the Jebel Ali with Haifa in Israel. The Red Sea crisis occurred as Oman's top five ports (Sultan Qaboos, Salalah Sohar, Khasab, Shinas, A'Suwaiq) registered instead rising performances, with a 1,5% annual increase in cargo handling in 2023.

The US, China and India: Multipolar Oman.

Oman's closer economic cooperation with the UAE, especially at infrastructural level, can open new avenues for foreign investments in the country. This is likely to incentivize global powers' competition in the Sultanate. But the economic side -although strategic in its own- is not the main dimension of rivalry. In late 2023, the US was briefed at the highest levels of China's efforts for building a military base in Oman, a plan that Beijing didn't deny Since the 1980s, the US has a defense agreement with Oman allowing the use of military bases in the country, a deal expanded in 2019 to include facilities and ports in Duqm and Salalah. China accounts for 90% of the Sultanate's oil export, it invested in Duqm Special Economic Zone, and its navy performs drills with Beijing (often together with Russia and Iran).

Recently, concern had already grown in the US for the establishment of a Chinese military facility in the UAE, off Abu Dhabi. Construction works stopped in 2021 after inspections by American officials at Khalifa port, and then resumed in mid-2023.

As the US-China competition in Oman, and the UAE, heightens, India acquires a privileged location in the Sultanate. On January 2024, few weeks later Sultan Haitham's visit to New Delhi, India secured a specific zone for its navy in Duqm port, in the context of India's rising deployment against piracy in the Arabian sea. In 2018, Oman already provided to the Indian Navy the access at Duqm port. The current move allows Muscat to reassure the American ally about its geopolitical alignment, while tightening military ties with an historical ally, like India, which is also a powerful voice in the Chinese-led BRICS Plus. Furthermore, now that Oman's public debt improves-reducing the Sultanate's reliance upon Chinese loans- it can better balance the traditional alliance with the US and the growing ties with China.

Although confirming its unmatched ´third way`, diplomacy-oriented approach to politics, Oman looks -under Sultan Haitham- more willing to take also firm positions in regional affairs. And more open to play the multipolar game its GCC's neighbours -starting from the UAE- have skilfully handled in latest years.