The UAE’s Rising Military Role in Africa: Defending Interests, Advancing Influence

• AnalysisAfrica · Middle East and North Africa
  by Eleonora Ardemagni

This analysis is the part two of: Eleonora Ardemagni, "One Port, One Node: The Emirati Geostrategic Road to Africa", ISPI, June 13, 2023

Since 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have strengthened military ties with many African countries, with particular regard to the Horn-Sahel region. This has accelerated since the 2020s. From one hand, this trend is the fallout of the Emirati rising economic presence in Africa (infrastructures and commercial ports; fossil energy and renewable energy; mining). On the other hand, it underlines the Emirati willingness to enhance its political influence in the continent.

The Emirati activism in Africa displays a significant maritime component. In fact, it combines commercial intents (ex. ports and coastal infrastructures), and geostrategic ones (ex. control of sea lanes; military projection), which are often overlapped. In Africa, the UAE's engagement can be traced in two main maritime directions. The first is the Red-Med (from the Red Sea towards the Mediterranean Sea), and the second is the Red-Indian direction (from the Red Sea towards the Western Indian Ocean), Therefore, the Red Sea stands at the centre of the Emirati cross-regional geostrategy, and this also comprises Yemen.

The UAE's military role in Africa follows three patterns. 1.The first is the countering of jihadi terrorism (al-Qaeda; IS), insurgent groups related to the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization the UAE lists as terrorist), and piracy: the goal is supporting African states to develop/improve defense capacity-building through military training and education. 2.The second pattern regards military provision and cooperation in the defense industry sector: the goal is tightening stability-oriented partnerships with governments in countries where the UAE invests. 3.The third pattern relates to the Emirati reported activity in conflict landscapes (Libya; Sudan; Ethiopia), usually denied by the Emirati authorities, to enhance its influence through the military support to non-state armed actors. In each cooperation case, one pattern tends to prevail on the others; however, two patterns can be co-present in the same theatre.

This three-pronged strategy of military presence in Africa also entails a flexible scheme of military outposts established, expanded or temporarily used by the Emiratis to support their goals. Such a rising role in the continent may expose the UAE to security risks in the medium to long-term, coming especially from increasing counterterrorism (CT) activities.

Main Findings:

• The UAE is developing defence and military relations with African states to secure its economic interests from instability and terrorism, also advancing its geostrategic influence;
• The tools of the Emirati rising military role in Africa mainly are: training and education; defense industry cooperation and arms provision; informal support to local armed actors;
• Since the 2010s, the UAE has established defense and military relations especially with Eastern Africa's states, and in the Sahel;
• In the last eight years (since 2016), the UAE signed in Africa eight Memorandum, or agreements, focused on the fight against terrorism (Somalia; Puntland; Ethiopia; Chad; Mauritania; Mali; Senegal; Kenya; Mozambique);
• Since the 2010s, the UAE provides or provided military training and education to eight African states (Somalia; Puntland; Somaliland; Ethiopia; Chad; Mauritania; Mali; Morocco), investing in local defence capacity-building;
• Since the 2010s, seven African states which signed concessions for commercial ports with the Emirati DP World and AD Ports Group later established defense industry and/or military ties with the UAE (DRC; Angola; Tanzania; Somaliland; Egypt; Senegal; Mozambique, see the previous analysis)
• Since mid-2010s, the UAE has developed a flexible scheme of military outposts in African states (Libya; Egypt; Eritrea; Somaliland; Puntland; Somalia; Chad) built/expanded/temporarily used by the Emiratis to support mutable military deployment and goals, thus far from traditional ′basing` patterns. Yemen fits into this scheme as part of the broader Red Sea region;

About counterterrorism, recent events shed light on the increasing Emirati engagement against jihadi groups in Africa, with particular regard to Somalia and the fight against the al-Qaeda's affiliate of al-Shabaab. On June 2023, the UAE carried out its first kinetic military operation in the country: the Emirati "first publicly reported airstrike" targeted a village held by jihadists in Galguduud region with a Turkish-made Bayraktar drone.

On February 2024, eighteen soldiers, including three from the UAE and one from Bahrain, were killed and 20 others, including two Emiratis, were injured due to an attack by a man wearing a military uniform who had infiltrated the General Gordon Training Center in Moghadishu, a military facility run by the Emiratis. The attack was claimed by al Shabaab: the assailant was a former terrorist who had defected and was later enrolled into the military.

Al Shabaab, who already targeted Emirati forces in 2015[1] and 2019[2] within Somali boundaries, defined the UAE an "enemy" for its backing of the Somali government in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist attack and the recent Somalia's navy deal with Türkiye reportedly pushed the UAE to reduce financial support for the Somali army, limiting funds to the defense of Moghadishu and vital installations.

In Africa as elsewhere, military training and education is key to the Emirati foreign policy.[3] This has been experimented in many African countries both with states and non-state armed actors in order to build bilateral cooperation (with states), and patron-client relations (with non-state armed actors). The UAE's focus on supporting military training and education in third countries builds upon the Emirati experience in peacekeeping operations and, more recently, on the emphasis on stabilization policies.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the UAE joined Western-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), included that in Somalia (the US-led UNITAF in 1993-94). In 2011, the UAE (and also Qatar) participated to the Operation Unified Protector in Libya: also Emirati fighter jets enforced the no-fly zone against Muammar Gaddafi's forces. On April 2021, the UAE supported the French military operation Barkhane in the Sahel, announcing "logistical support flights to support the efforts of the international community, led by France, to combat terrorism". In the Emirati perspective, the involvement in stabilization efforts aims first of all to enhance its geopolitical position in third countries: promoting wide-scale institution-building alongside partners is instead a complementary goal, thus "stressing the political nature of stabilisation activities".[4]

The Emirati Military Ties in Africa. Patterns, Goals and Tools

The UAE is developing military ties with African countries mainly to counter terrorism, insurgencies and piracy, and for strengthening governments' hold on the territory in countries where the Emiratis have economic interests.

PATTERN ONE
Countering terrorism and piracy: The Emirati defense capacity-building goal through military training and education.

Somalia: On January 2023, the UAE and Somalia signed an agreement to enhance military and security ties, along with anti-terrorism cooperation, to bolster "institutional capacity-building of Somalia's security forces and support ongoing efforts to eradicate al-Shabaab from Somalia". The UAE mainly aids the Stabilization Unit forces to secure the capital, a formation trained in Eritrea as of 2023; Somali army's recruits undergo part of the Emirati-led training program in Uganda and Ethiopia. The UAE also provides funding and training for the Somali military police. On March 2023, the UAE deployed military vehicles in the Southern Somali region of Jubaland, as confirmed by a regional government statement. The deal would also include the training of local forces.[5] In 2018, the UAE had ended a military training programme with Moghadishu's army, started in 2014, due to strained relations with the government in the framework of the GCC crisis with Qatar. According to Abu Dhabi, the UAE also paid soldiers' salaries and built training centres and a hospital as of 2018.

Puntland: Since 2012, the UAE has been training, equipping, and funding the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) with headquarter in Bosaso and bases in several coastal town such as Qandala and Hafun, and also at Galgala Mountains. The Force was established in 2011 to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden although has gradually turned into a counterterrorism actor. The UAE provides monthly salaries to the 2000 personnel since its foundation .

Somaliland: In 2018, the UAE launched a training program for local police and military forces, as part of a wider 2017 deal for the building of a military airport in Berbera.

Ethiopia: The UAE supports the training of the Republican Guard, an elite military unit established in 2018 and tasked with the protection of the prime minister, senior public officials and major installations in the country. In 2023, Ethiopia and the UAE signed a Memorandum to fight terrorism; on November 2023, the embassy of the UAE in Ethiopia, in cooperation with the War College of the Ethiopian ministry of defense organized the lecture "Fighting terrorism and extremism".

Chad: In June 2023, the UAE and Chad signed a military cooperation agreement. In August 2023, the UAE sent military vehicles and security equipment to support government's efforts in fighting terrorism and enhancing border protection, in the aftermath of the coup in Niger. In early 2024, the UAE would have deployed troops in Chad mainly to train army's soldiers.

Mauritania: In 2016, the UAE established a military academy in Mauritania, the Mohammed bin Zayed Defense College, to train senior officers from the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger), the France-backed task force against jihadi terrorism established in 2014. Training for senior officers began in 2018. In 2019, the UAE discussed ways to enhance cooperation in the defence field with Mauritania. The UAE had pledged 35 million dollars in 2017 to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; 20 million dollars were promised in 2020. After a series of coups in country members, the G5 Sahel is now on the roads towards disbandment.

Mali: In 2019, the UAE and Mali signed a military cooperation agreement. The deal was reportedly complementary to the training of Malian forces in Mauritania as part of the G5 Sahel.[6] In 2020, the UAE provided 30 Typhoon armoured vehicles and 30 made-in-UAE Cougar light armoured vehicles to Bamako.

Nigeria: In 2023, a delegation of the UAE National Defence College visited its counterpart in Abuja, paving the way for collaboration, for instance on exchange programmes and knowledge sharing.

PATTERN TWO
Securing governments in countries where the UAE invests: stability-oriented partnerships through defense industry cooperation and procurement.

Egypt: In 2023, Egypt's Defense Ministry and the UAE's Tawazun Council, the leading Emirati defense industry government entity, signed a Memorandum on defense cooperation at the IDEX defense expo in Abu Dhabi. The MoU focused on defense, industrial and technological cooperation.

Morocco: In 2006, the UAE and Morocco signed a military cooperation agreement comprising training and technical, material assistance. In 2021, the countries agreed to strengthen military and intelligence cooperation, and to collaborate on military industry.

Senegal: In 2020, the UAE and Senegal signed in Abu Dhabi a Memorandum on counterterrorism, and an agreement between defense ministries on military cooperation. In 2023, Senegal acquired UAE-made light armoured vehicles.

Angola: In 2023, the Emirati Abu Dhabi Ship Building, a subsidiary of EDGE (the Abu Dhabi-based defense conglomerate), signed a 1 billion dollars deal with the country to provide a new fleet of 71-metre corvettes to the Angolan Navy.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): As part of a 2021 billion dollars investment package in the DRC, the Emiratis invested in the security field of the country, also with the delivery of 30 tactical armoured vehicles. In 2024, the Congolese army would reportedly use Emirati-made armoured vehicles to enhance the defense of Goma city against rebel groups.

Kenya: In 2018, Kenya acquired helicopters from the UAE to fight al-Shabaab. In 2019, GAL (the UAE's Global Aerospace Logistics which is part of EDGE) signed a deal with Kenya Air Force to provide maintenance and overhaul services for the aircraft.

Uganda: In 2021, Streit Group, an Emirati armoured vehicle manufacturer, signed a partnership with the National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) to produce armoured vehicles in Uganda. The NEC is the commercial branch of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF).

Tanzania: In 2023, the Emirati EDGE signed a cooperation agreement on defence industry with the People's Defence Force (air, land, and sea defence domains).

Mozambique: In 2022, the UAE and Mozambique signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation against terrorism. The countries agreed to share information and expertise about countering terrorism financing.

PATTERN THREE
The Emirati Military Outposts in Africa: A Flexible, Task-Oriented Strategy That Comprises Yemen

As it steps up its involvement in African military affairs, the UAE develops since a decade a flexible scheme of military outposts in the continent (Libya; Egypt; Eritrea; Somaliland; Puntland; Somalia; Chad), especially in the Horn of Africa and in the Libya-Sahel sub-region. These outposts are -some of them were- built/expanded/temporarily used by the Emiratis to support UAE's mutable military interests and goals. As noted by Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah "In partnership with key regional and international allies, the UAE has pursued a security strategy […] creating strategic depth through foreign military installations and deployments"; bases that can be also seen as tools of the Emirati foreign policy.[7]

As of 2024, some military outposts have been left by the Emiratis, or they have reduced their presence in those facilities, mainly operated now by host nations with the support, in some cases, of Emirati local allies. This scheme reflects both the trajectory of UAE's economic investments in Africa -and so of its evolving security priorities- and the informal military assistance provided by the UAE to varied players in Libya, Sudan, and Ethiopia, a circumstance that Abu Dhabi has denied so far.

In the Emirati geostrategy in the Red Sea-Western Indian Ocean region, conflict-torn Yemen plays a prominent role (Perim/Mayyun; Socotra archipelago). A cause-effect relationship emerges in fact between the Emirati military and logistical needs during its deployment in Yemen war (2015-2019), and the UAE's choices about African military facilities. The Emirati military presence in the Socotra archipelago (2018-), which is part of Yemen although closer to the Somali coast, has marked the gradual passage from the ´phase 1` (power projection) to the ´phase 2` (power protection) of the Emirati military facilities strategy in the Western Indian Ocean, comprised Africa. This means the Emiratis have mostly recalibrated their ´outposts strategy` from power projection goals to the protection of already acquired routes and influence in and around the African continent.[8]

In so doing, the UAE displays a flexible, task-oriented strategy for military facilities, far from traditional permanent ′basing` models mainly designed to counter state threats. As a matter of fact, outposts serve the Emirati scope to counter non state armed groups (ex. terrorist organizations; insurgents; pirates), or to capitalize on selected local groups and networks to strengthen the Emirati leverage in the area. This flexible approach not only allows the UAE to keep a certain degree of discretion about outposts abroad -and confidentiality regarding their unofficial military activism- but also to quickly recalibrate their presence in African countries to minimize security risks, financial costs, and political overexposure, at local and also at media level.

2016-2021. Focus on Libya and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait:

The ´phase 1` of the Emirati military outpost strategy can be traced between 2016 and 2021. This phase was about power projection: the UAE's military-oriented foreign policy reached its apex and manifested, most of all, in Libya and in Yemen war. The focus was on the Bab el-Mandeb choke-point, both on the Yemeni and the African side.[9]

Assab (Eritrea) 2015-2021: The base mainly supported the Emirati deployment in Yemen. In 2015, the UAE obtained a 30-year lease agreement from Eritrea for the deep water port, as part of a broader deal allowing the Gulf coalition to use Eritrea's land, airspace, and territorial waters for military operations in Yemen. Since mid-2015 to 2019, Assab hosted Emirati military vehicles and drones, also serving as an Emirati-run training centre for UAE-backed Yemeni and Sudanese fighters to be deployed in the country. The base, key to the amphibious operations against some Houthi-held islands in the Red Sea and to regain Aden, was partly dismantled by the UAE in 2021, as the Emirati troops had completed their withdrawal from Yemen. The Assab base would have played a role also in the Emirati-backed military operations of the Ethiopian Federal Army in the Tigray region.[10]

Al Khadim (Libya) 2016-2020: In 2019-2020, the UAE performed airstrikes in Libya in support of Khalifa Haftar's forces. The UAE expanded the Al Khadim air base (65 miles east from Benghazi) in 2017, stationing weapons since mid-2016. At that time, the Emiratis supplied and operated drones located at the air base. During the Libya's civil war, the UAE relied not only upon Al Khadim (Al Majr province), but also on Al Jufra (2016-2019, in central Libya), and the Egyptian military base of Sidi Barrani, close to Libya.

Sidi Barrani (Egypt) 2016-: At the border with Libya, the Egyptian air base received aircraft regularly flying from the UAE during Libya's war[11], and from Assab to eastern Libya/western Egypt. In late 2019, satellite imagery show "a rapid build-up of cargo capacity" at Sidi Barrani, which have likely replaced Al Khadim as the Emirati main pivot outpost in North Africa. In 2020, Emirati Mirage fighter jets were deployed at the base.

Berbera (Somaliland) 2017-2019: The 2017 deal for the construction of a military airport came in the framework of the Emirati troops' presence in Yemen. In 2019, when the UAE announced the troops' withdrawal from Yemen, the project was transformed into a civilian one, and the modernized Berbera airport opened in late 2021. The UAE invested 55 million dollars for the rebuilding of the Berbera International Airport for passenger and cargo services.

Socotra (Yemen) 2019-: For the UAE, establishing a military outpost in Socotra has been more related to maritime security and projection in the Western Indian Ocean than to Yemen's battlefield. For this reason, the project ideally connects the first and the second phase of the Emirati military outpost strategy, with the focus moving from projection to protection. According to media reports, the UAE built a military base in Socotra, in 2019 to train Yemeni recruits close to the Hawlaf port modernized and rebuilt by the Emiratis in 2018. In 2020, the Emirati-backed secessionists of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized the power on the archipelago.

2021-2024. Focus on Sudan, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean:

The ´phase 2` of the Emirati military outpost strategy can be identified since 2021. Because of heightened conflict risks between Middle East's powers, the UAE opted since 2019 for a gradual recalibration of its foreign policy. Therefore, the Emiratis embraced an economy-oriented approach primarily aimed to power protection to preserve acquired geopolitical gains in the area. This phase is epitomized by the Emirati troops' withdrawal from Yemen, and a less assertive posture in Libya, with however an opposite trend in Sudan. Recalibration has impacted also the rationale of military bases: the focus has moved towards east in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, taking into account the rise of multiple threats to maritime security (Iran; Yemen's Houthis; piracy).

Perim/Mayyun (Yemen) 2021-: As it scaled down from the Horn of Africa, the UAE has stepped up its military presence in South-Western Yemen regions. In early 2021, the Emiratis built, according to satellite imagery, an airstrip and an airbase in the small island of Perim (also known as Mayyun), in the Bab el-Mandeb strait, to host large military transport aircraft. In 2021, Yemen's National Resistance Forces leader Tareq Saleh acknowledged that part of his Emirati-backed troops are stationed on the strategic island.

Abd al-Kuri (Yemen) 2022-: In early 2022, the construction of an airstrip started, and halted few months later, in the north of Abd al-Kuri, the second island of the Socotra archipelago, whose scarce population mostly inhabits the south. Abd al-Kuri distances 130 km from the main Socotra island, and it's the closest of the archipelago to Somalia. In early 2024, satellite imagery registered "increased activity" including the construction of an airstrip, near to the water, and the movement of heavy vehicles. According to the AP, the runway can accommodate attack, surveillance and transport aircraft, even some of the heaviest bombers", given its length.

Bosaso (Puntland) 2022-: The outpost has to be framed in the UAE's commitment to maritime security in the Gulf of Aden (ex. piracy, Houthis). The UAE established a military base and airport in Bosaso, with Emirati soldiers landing in the city in late 2022 with at least 12 military flights also carrying military vehicles.[12]

Kismayo (Jubaland, Somalia) 2023-: In the context of the fight against al-Shabaab, and of threats against freedom of navigation in the Western Indian Ocean, the UAE has started the construction of a military base in Kismayo, on the Indian Ocean.[13]

Amdjarass (Chad) 2023-: In the framework of the Sudan war, the UAE established an air base in Chad. This would allow the Emiratis to provide military assistance to the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as "Hemetti") in Sudan, a circumstance denied by Abu Dhabi while described as "credible" by the UN.[14] The UAE opened in 2023 a field hospital in Amdjarass, close to Sudan border, to treat Sudanese refugees and, according to media reports, also RSF's wounded fighters from Sudan. Satellite imagery reveals the city airport was turned into a military-style airfield, with temporary aircraft shelters and a hangar. A media analysis found that the pattern of airfield construction in Amdjarass resembles the base the Emiratis previously expanded at Al Khadim, in eastern Libya, to support Haftar's forces, with many cargo plan landing now in Amdjarass.[15]

Conclusion and Prospects. The Growing Emirati Role Against Terrorism and Maritime Insecurity in and around Africa.

Since mid-2010s, the UAE has rapidly strengthened its military ties with African states, following a surge in economic investments on commercial ports and infrastructures. In countries particularly affected by terrorism, insurgencies, and piracy, Emirati defense cooperation tends to focus on military training and education (ex. Somalia with also Puntland and Somaliland; Ethiopia; Chad; Mali; Mauritania). With regard to military training, the UAE works both at bilateral level, and in multilateral fora such as the G5 Sahel, the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, and UN training initiatives for female peacekeepers.[16]

In countries where the UAE has relevant economic investments, military cooperation centres on defense industry and arms provision. This allows the Emiratis to support national security and governments' stability, thus ultimately securing their interests abroad (ex. Morocco; Egypt; Senegal; Angola, DRC; Uganda; Tanzania; Mozambique).

Since mid-2010s, the UAE has also developed a flexible scheme of military outposts in the continent, especially in the Horn of Africa and in the Libya-Sahel sub-region (Libya; Egypt; Eritrea; Somaliland; Puntland; Somalia; Chad). This mirrors the trajectory of UAE's economic investments in Africa and, in some cases, the need to secure maritime routes, also revealing the military assistance allegedly provided by the UAE in conflict landscapes to varied non-state and state players in Libya, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

In their military deployment in Yemen (2015-2019), the Emiratis faced most of the issues they are now dealing with in Africa: from building the defense capacity of local forces to ground operations for counterterrorism, from securing coasts to the establishment of flexible military outposts. For this reason, the involvement in Yemen -which indirectly continues with the Emirati military support to Yemeni Southern and Western groups- represents a milestone experience for UAE's projection in unstable contexts, comprised some African countries.

The fight against armed threats -from armed groups affiliated/connected to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to piracy- is going to mark the increasing UAE's military role in Africa, especially in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa regions. This will likely expose Emirati troops and trainers to further security risks, as occurred in Yemen and, more recently, in Somalia.

In the Sahel, the UAE is now cooperating with anti-Western military juntas after a series of coups that dismantled security cooperation with European countries and the US. In these landscapes, the UAE proved to be a pragmatic player -also to protect its economic investments from jihadi terrorist attacks- regardless who is in power, thus prioritizing economic goals and national influence. In this framework, the Emiratis are also interested in preventing the spill-over of Sahel's terrorist groups to the West of Africa (Ghana; Benin; Togo; Ivory Coast), and its economic networks.

In the Horn of Africa, maritime security is going to be the focus of increasing UAE's military efforts. From one hand, this is due to the wide instability of the Red Sea region, with Houthis' attacks from Yemen against international navigation in the Southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, emerging signs of convergent interests -or even economic collaboration[17]- between local non state armed actors (al-Shabaab and Somali pirates) who share anti-Emirati sentiments, not only raises new maritime risks, but could also trigger further resentment against the Emirati presence.

This adds to smuggling networks. In 2023, the Panel of Experts on Yemen "believes the existence of a closely coordinated smuggling network that operates between Yemen and Somalia, receiving weapons from a common source", and between Yemen and Sudan.[18] On the other hand, the growth of al-Qaeda and Islamic State's groups along the Eastern Africa coast (Somalia; Tanzania; Mozambique) occurred in recent years includes another layer of insecurity both to navigation and to the UAE's rising commercial interests in the Western Indian Ocean.

In the African continent, the UAE will more and more test not only its geostrategic interests, but also its ambitions of middle power able to defend and advance its own investments and routes abroad, through and alongside local partners.

[1] In 2015, al-Shabaab claimed a car bomb against a vehicle carrying Emirati officials in Moghadishu: the attack killed several people but not Emirati officials https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0P414Y/.

[2] In 2019, al-Shabab claimed an attack that killed a Maltese man working for Dubai's P&O Ports in Puntland because, in their view, "he worked for a company that "occupies" the area's Bosaso Port https://apnews.com/general-news-cdbee374e0aa4d86a94f9d99728dbbf5".

[3] For a broader overview, Eleonora Ardemagni, "The UAE's Military Training-Focused Foreign Policy", Carnegie Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 22, 2020 https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/83033.

[4] Victor Gervais and Saskia van Genugten (eds.), Stabilising the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa. Regional Actors and New Approaches, Springer Palgrave MacMillan, 2020, p. 8.

[5] Author's interview with the Horn of Africa expert Guled Ahmed, March 2024.

[6] Eva Magdalena Stambøl and Tobias Berger, "Transnationally entangled (in)securities: The UAE, Turkey, and the Saharan political economy of danger", Security Dialogue, 54(5), 2023, 493-514.

[7] As stated by İsmail Numan Telci and Tuba Öztürk Horoz, "Military Bases in the Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates", Insight Turkey Spring 2018, Volume 20, Number 2 https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/military-bases-in-the-foreign-policy-of-the-united-arab-emirates.

[8] About the Emirati foreign policy recalibration, Eleonora Ardemagni, "The UAE's Military Adjustment in the Bab El-Mandeb: From Power Projection to Power Protection", ISPI Commentary, April 19, 2021 https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/uaes-military-adjustment-bab-el-mandeb-power-projection-power-protection-30108

[9] "The UAE has established a series of maritime access points on the Horn of Africa and along Yemen's coast that enable it to shape maritime trade and gather information about rivals' and adversaries' activities in the region". Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah, "Evolving UAE Military and Foreign Security Cooperation: Path Toward Military Professionalism", Carnegie Middle East Centre, Carnegie Paper, January 19, 2021 https://carnegie-mec.org/2021/01/12/evolving-uae-military-and-foreign-security-cooperation-path-toward-military-professionalism-pub-83549.

[10] During the war between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (2020-2022), the UAE would have provided military support to the Ethiopian army, comprised drones. Abu Dhabi denies https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html and evidence is still lacking https://www.dw.com/en/fact-check-are-other-nations-involved-in-the-war-in-tigray/a-56891431. The assistance reportedly peaked as the conflict intensified in the second half of 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html, with the opening of an air-bridge between the two countries https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/25/uae-air-bridge-provides-military-support-to-ethiopia-govt.

[11] According to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, the UAE was in non-compliance with the implementation of the arms embargo as of 2021 and "did not provide responses or detailed information in the responses that they sent to the Panel's enquiries". The Panel identifies a land bridge between the United Arab Emirates and western Egypt/eastern Libya. See Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2021/229, pp.14-15 and p.28.

[12] Author's interview with the Horn of Africa expert Guled Ahmed, March 2024.

[13] Author's interview with the Horn of Africa expert Guled Ahmed, March 2024.

[14] According to an UN Security Council undisclosed report seen by Reuters, accusations that the UAE had provided military support to the RSF "several times per week" via Amdjarass in northern Chad are "credible", while the UAE states that flights delivered humanitarian aid. Voice of America (by Reuters), "UN Report Says Ethnic Violence Kills Up to 15,000 in 1 Sudan City", January 19, 2024 https://www.voanews.com/a/un-report-says-ethnic-violence-kills-up-to-15-000-in-1-sudan-city/7448068.html.

[15] Since mid-2023, dozens of cargo flights have occurred each month from Abu Dhabi to N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, and Amdjarass. These would reportedly supply arms, ammunition, vehicles and other military assistance from the UAE to the RSF via Chad. See UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 January 2024 from the Panel of Experts on theSudan addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2024/65, pp.14-15; Wolfram Lacher, "Chad Navigates Multipolar Disorder. The Perils of Playing Geopolitics for Regime Survival", SWP, Megatrends Afrika, Policy Paper 19, December 2023.

[16] Since 2018, the UAE organizes a UN programme hosted by the UAE-based Khawla bint Al Azwar Military Academy for Women to train women peacekeepers from African, Arab and Asian countries. The ongoing initiative is part of the UAE's Ministry of Defense agreement with UN Women to increase the number of female peacekeepers coming, among the others, from Egypt, Sudan, Gambia, Chad and Senegal.

[17] Al Shabab militants in northern Somalia (Sanaag, Gulf of Aden) have reportedly reached a deal with Somali pirates to provide protection while receiving in exchange a ransom cut. Hassan-kafi Mohamed and Jonathan Clayton, "Al Shabab shows its reach on land as it ventures into piracy on the high seas", The National, December 29, 2023 https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/africa/2023/12/29/al-shabab-shows-its-reach-on-land-as-it-ventures-into-piracy-on-the-high-seas/; author's interview with the Horn of Africa expert Guled Ahmed, March 2024.

[18]UN Security Council S/2023/833, "Letter dated 2 November 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council", p.28.

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