Rwanda, M23 and Goma: Déjà-vu

• Commentary Africa

Recent events in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with the fall of North Kivu's capital, Goma, as a provisional low, are inscribed in a decades-long evolution. The extreme weakness of the Congolese state dates back to the Mobutu Sese Seko era, while the destabilisation of the east started in the second half of the 1990s, as an offspring of the Rwandan civil war and the genocide against the Tutsi. Close to two million Rwandans, among them, the defeated government army and militias fled to the Kivu provinces in 1994. By 1996 they had become a security concern for the new Kigali regime. Hiding behind Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) rebel force, the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) cleared the refugee camps and, together with a large regional coalition, defeated the Mobutu regime. On this occasion, Rwanda (and Uganda) became aware of eastern Congo's economic potential and geopolitical importance.

Rwanda has been waging war since then, using successive Congolese rebel movements as proxies. After the AFDL came the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and (twice) the M23. In 2012, a preview of the current situation occurred. With strong support from the Rwandan army, and rebaptised Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), the M23 occupied increasingly large parts of North Kivu, and in November seized Goma. The difference with today lay in the international reactions. In March 2013, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), put in place by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, in support of the UN Mission established in 1999, MONUSCO, and the Congolese army, the FARDC. The UN Group of Experts accused Rwanda of actively supporting the rebels on the ground, and international condemnations followed. Several governments - including those of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the European Union - suspended or delayed part of their assistance programmes to Rwanda. The M23's fate was sealed when, on 1 November, the US and UK governments made clear that Rwanda's intervention had to end. Two days later, the M23 collapsed and withdrew to Rwanda and Uganda. For Rwanda, this outcome was disastrous. With the M23's defeat, it lost its political, military and economic foothold in a part of the DRC it considered a "natural" area of influence.

The international reactions have been much less robust since the M23 resumed fighting in November 2021, again with the decisive support of Rwanda. This happened just after the DRC President, Felix Tshisekedi, invited the Ugandan army onto Congolese territory to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), originally a Ugandan rebel movement which has been operating on the Congolese side of the border for many years. In light of the strained Rwandan-Ugandan relations at the time, Kigali resented the presence of Ugandan troops in what it considers its backyard. Like in the past, Rwanda denied any involvement, even after the UN Group of Experts again documented in detail, in December 2022, the direct intervention of the RDF on the territory of the DRC. The Group found substantial evidence attesting to violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime, including the direct intervention of the RDF to reinforce the M23 by the provision of troops, weapons and ammunition. The exploitation of natural resources remained a major driver of regional interference and instability. The UN Group of Experts December 2024 midterm report found that the M23 established a parallel administration controlling mining activities, trade, transport and the taxation of minerals produced. At least 150 tons of coltan were fraudulently exported to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production, leading to the largest contamination of mineral supply chains in the Great Lakes region recorded to date.

International condemnations of Rwanda's aggression became increasingly outspoken. In remarks at the UN Security Council, the US stated in February 2024 that "Rwanda must end its support for M23. It must also withdraw Rwandan forces from Congolese territory and immediately remove any of its surface-to-air missile systems, which credible reporting indicates have been responsible for intentionally firing on the aerial assets of MONUSCO". In similar wording, on 28 February, the European Union stated that "Rwanda must immediately withdraw its troops from the DRC (and) cease all support for the M23". A few days later, French President Emmanuel Macron also urged Rwanda to withdraw its troops from Congolese territory. On 30 June, the UN Security Council "condemned foreign military support provided to M23" and "demanded the cessation of such support and the immediate withdrawal of any such external party", without however explicitly mentioning Rwanda.

Despite efforts by some states, in particular, Angola in the context of the "Luanda Process", international and regional attempts at conflict resolution were unsuccessful. The latest attempt of 2024 was due to bring Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Tshisekedi together on 15 December, at the invitation of Angolan President, João Lourenço. Tshisekedi was present, but Kagame failed to show up, blaming "unresolved critical issues", in particular the DRC's refusal to engage in direct talks with the M23. For his part, Tshisekedi refused to participate in an East African Community (EAC) extraordinary virtual summit on 30 January 2025, which had been called by Kenya's President William Ruto. On the ground, the deployment of the SADC force, SAMIDRC, at the end of 2023 awoke unpleasant memories for Rwanda, as an SADC intervention stopped the Rwanda-backed RCD rebellion in 1998-2000, and the FIB defeated the M23 in 2013.

Despite verbal condemnations and the deployment of international contingents, at no time was Rwanda threatened with sanctions. Convinced that it could act with impunity, the RDF took their support for the M23 to its fullest extent. Goma fell on 27 January 2025 after minimal resistance by the FARDC, MONUSCO and SAMIRDC forces. A dozen foreign peacekeepers were killed, most of them South Africans. Only then, much too late, were sanctions seriously considered, with Germany leading the way. For now, the conflict's outcome has been different from 2013, which begs the question: What next?

Contrary to fears shared by many Congolese, it is unlikely that Rwanda will annex North Kivu, as this would be too blatant a violation of international law. It may however put in place an informal protectorate under the M23, which has already been operating parallel administration and taxation structures. Rwanda is also eying South Kivu, and its capital Bukavu may well be the next target. That would put Rwanda on a collision course with its southern neighbour, Burundi, with which relations have been hostile for a decade. Will Uganda, which has ambiguous relations with Rwanda, accept Rwandan overrule in a part of the DRC it considers vital for security and economic reasons? SADC and South Africa, a continental heavyweight, have been deeply humiliated by their defeat, and may well want to reaffirm their position. How far will the so-called international community tolerate such an evolution? The US position is uncertain, with President Donald Trump having a limited interest in Africa, and perhaps even seeing Rwanda as a useful proxy in the rush for critical minerals. And will the Tshisekedi regime survive what many Congolese perceive as a traumatic insult meted out by a country one hundred times smaller than the DRC? Unless an end is soon put to the M23 rebellion and Rwanda's support for it, this will be a Pandora's Box, with potentially devastating regional consequences.