Gaza’s Future Amid Conflicting Plans and Uncertain Prospects

• MED Med this Week Middle East and North Africa

The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today we shed light on Gaza's uncertain future and the March 4^th Arab Summit in Cairo.

Although the global spotlight has shifted back to the Ukraine conflict, recent developments in Gaza could significantly impact the region's future and the overall Palestinian issue. On March 4th, Egypt hosted a crucial meeting attended by several Arab countries, at the presence of the Arab League, the EU and the UN, at which "Egypt's Reconstruction Plan for Gaza" was adopted. The plan for the USD 53 bn worth reconstruction of the Gaza Strip has sparked strong reactions: harshly criticised by Israel, it has received support from Hamas. In addition to reviving Arab support for the two-state solution and condemning the humanitarian aid blockade imposed by Israel last Sunday, the plan stands as the Arab alternative to Washington's proposal for temporary US governance of Gaza and to Trump's much-contested "Gaza Riviera" project. However, the document's content has raised several concerns. Indeed, its core envisions the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, support for elections in the Palestinian territories, the deployment of peacekeepers in the Strip, and the creation of a management committee for Gaza under the auspices of a Palestinian technocrat government. All backed by the financial, material and political support of the signing Arab nations. Despite the effort to present a detailed technical plan, its political vagueness represents its inherent weakness. The absence of explicit references to Hamas's exclusion from future arrangements for Gaza leaves many questions unanswered, highlighting the apparent lack of a unified stance among Arab countries on this matter. As such, the question of Hamas's future and potential renunciation of armed struggle is likely already a point of contention for the apparently unified Arab front. Meanwhile, the impasse over the ceasefire, which has led to the Israeli block (and weaponisation) of aid, has been overshadowed, together with the US attempt to secretly hold direct talks with Hamas about the fate of Israeli hostages in Gaza. Ultimately, the new conditions proposed by the US and endorsed by Israel - entailing the extension of the first phase of the January agreement - appear to be an attempt by Netanyahu to keep the conflict locked in the initial phase of temporary truce, thereby preventing any move toward a full resolution of the war. Indeed, accepting these conditions would allow the Israeli Prime Minister to preserve the cohesion of his coalition by appeasing hardliners who oppose ending the war without completely dismantling Hamas - a goal that now seems not only unattainable but also a facade concealing Netanyahu's true priority: safeguarding his power and reputation.

Experts from the ISPI network discuss Gaza's uncertain future and the March 4^th Arab Summit in Cairo.

This new ceasefire plan should be seen as Netanyahu's one, not Witkoff's

"Netanyahu is not (!) interested in stopping the war, all due to personal considerations and interests rather than considerations related to the welfare and security of the state or its citizens. The continuation of fighting helps him maintain his rule, keep his coalition intact, prevent the establishment of an inquiry commission, diminish public criticism, and even more easily paint opposition voices as traitors. Hamas's continued control of Gaza and the continued captivity of Israeli hostages in their hands make it easier for him to continue fighting. Hamas continues to be an asset for Netanyahu. Therefore, Netanyahu is in no hurry to return the hostages, certainly not all of them, and avoids as much as possible leading the building of an alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza. This is why he refused to embrace Biden's plan, and this is why he has successfully worked to sabotage any previous attempts to release the hostages as well as the move to phase B in the current agreement. This is how to understand his choice to warmly embrace the American plan to extend the first phase. If Hamas agrees, then he has gained more time. If Hamas refuses, then he has gained an opportunity to return to war. To a large extent, this plan should be seen as Netanyahu's plan, not Witcoff's."

Roee Kibrik, Director of Research, Mitvim

Trump holds the cards for the Arab-backed Gaza 2030 Plan

"Egypt's Arab-endorsed proposal for Gaza rejects President Trump's ethnic cleansing scheme and offers a USD 53 billion three-phased roadmap for relief, reconstruction, and governance. While the proposal represents a viable pathway for rebuilding Gaza, unites Arab opposition to the displacement of Palestinians, and affirms Palestinian-led governance, it remains futile without international commitments and US support. The proposed technocratic transitional government, paving the way for PA control, aligns with global consensus but faces Israeli and American rejection. The feasibility of the Arab plan is further challenged by the US and Israel sabotaging the ceasefire agreement and making subsequent threats against Gaza. Whether the plan advances hinges on Trump's willingness to engage Arab leaders and push Netanyahu to accept permanent ceasefire. What is clear, however, is that only a political solution that ends the siege and occupation and ensures Palestinian self-determination can achieve lasting peace and security."

Tamara Kharroub, Deputy Executive Director & Senior Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC

Trump is confident Egypt and Saudi will eventually allow a permanent Israeli crackdown

"Over the past two decades, an exceptionally close - almost "special" and quasi-osmotic - relationship has developed between the American Right and the Israeli Right. This ideological and political alignment plays today a major role in shaping the policies and actions of the Trump administration. From a public relations standpoint, both domestically and internationally, the first phase of the agreement has not unfolded according to Netanyahu's plan. He appears to be the one now dictating the terms and the postponement of the implementation of phase two. Trump is going along, seemingly convinced that from Gaza to the West Bank, the only response is a permanent Israeli crackdown, and that regional allies, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, will ultimately acquiesce due to their economic and military dependence on the United States."

Mario Del Pero, Senior Associate Research Fellow, ISPI; Professor, SciencesPo

International law applies to the conflict in Gaza: humanitarian aid should always be allowed

"The Israeli decision to cut off vital aid to the war-ravaged territory of Gaza is worsening the humanitarian crisis for the Strip's 2.4 million residents. This move effectively weaponises humanitarian assistance, using it as leverage to pressure Hamas. Under international law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, both Israeli and Palestinian armed forces have an obligation to protect civilians and allow humanitarian aid to reach those in need. Indeed, restricting aid access violates these principles and exacerbates the suffering of innocent people caught in the conflict. Additionally, as Arab countries meet in Cairo to address the crisis in Gaza, the United States has accelerated the delivery of USD 4 billion in military aid to Israel, further highlighting the urgent need to reach common ground on Gaza's future and the broader conflict, prioritising the well-being of the people. As such, the current impasse on the ceasefire threatens to derail the fragile truce reached after 15 months of devastating war in Gaza. With the first phase coming to an end, deep disagreements between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist movement are now jeopardising the continuation of the process. Hamas insists that the next phase must include a "comprehensive and permanent ceasefire" and a "complete withdrawal" of Israeli forces from Gaza. In contrast, Israel prioritises securing the release of more hostages by asking for an extension of the first phase. This, while reserving the right to resume fighting at any time to destroy Hamas if it does not disarm."

Michelle Pace, Professor in Global Studies, Roskilde University

Hamas has only one card left to play: the hostages

"Apart from securing the return of the Israeli hostages back in Israel and the release of Palestinian prisoners, Hamas and Israel have contradictory goals in the ceasefire. Hamas wants Israel out of Gaza, seeking a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, while Israel aims to maintain a military presence to destroy Hamas. As such, Hamas is eager to move to phase two of the truce, as it entails Israel leaving the area, while the latter is highly reluctant to do so. Given that Hamas only has one card to play - the hostages - it is likely to hold on to them until it gets guarantees that phase two will actually take place. It will probably also try to use its influence with Egypt and Qatar to bring pressure upon Israel to stick to the ceasefire agreement."

Joas Wagemakers, Associate Professor of Islamic & Arabic Studies, Utrecht University