EU Statement on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as delivered at the IAEA Board of Governors, 7 March 2024

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EU Statement on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as delivered at the IAEA Board of Governors, 7 March 2024

07.03.2024 Press and information team of the Delegation to UN and OSCE in Vienna

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina[1], the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino align themselves with this statement.

The European Union welcomes the Director General's update on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran contained in document GOV/2024/8 and thanks Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 1 March 2024. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective, independent and impartial work in verifying Iran's safeguards obligations. The EU encourages the IAEA to continue to use all safeguards-relevant information available to it as per standard practice.

The EU is gravely concerned that the Agency reports, once more, that it is still not in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful and that it is not able to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations under its NPT safeguards agreement. Iran has, once again, not made any progress in resolving the remaining outstanding safeguards issues and has not provided the Agency with any technically credible information as requested, despite numerous resolutions of the Board and many opportunities provided by the DG over a number of years. These issues stem from Iran's legally binding obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and still need to be resolved to provide assurance that this nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. In November 2022 the Board decided in its resolution that it was "essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material" that Iran clarify all outstanding safeguards issues. We reiterate our call on Iran to act promptly to implement its safeguards obligations so as to restore confidence by entering into full, substantial and constructive cooperation with the Agency. All safeguards issues will remain under our close scrutiny, until the DG reports that they are no longer outstanding.

It is five years since uranium particles of anthropogenic origin were found at Turquzabad and three and a half years since similar particles were also found at Varamin. The EU remains deeply concerned by the presence of nuclear material at these undeclared locations and that the current location of this nuclear material and/or of equipment contaminated by nuclear material, which may still exist in Iran today, is not known to the Agency.

We note that Iran has provided the required corrected nuclear material accounting reports regarding the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance evaluation at the Uranium Conversion Facility. We also note that this indicates that the amount of uranium contained in the solid waste sent from JHL to UCF for dissolution was less than had been declared by Iran in 2003-2004. This requires further consideration by the Agency, because it is a matter of great concern, as Iran has conducted undeclared experiments in JHL to produce uranium metal in the period 1995-2002.

We join the DG in deeply regretting that Iran has yet to reverse its decision to withdraw the designations of several experienced Agency inspectors, which is essential to fully allow the Agency to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively. Iran's unprecedented and politically driven measure is unambiguously contrary to the cooperation that is required and expected in order to facilitate the effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement.

It is indispensable that the IAEA is able to detect and report in a timely manner any move by Iran to escalate its nuclear activities. We remain seriously concerned by the technical capability of Iran to reach unprecedented levels of enrichment which has grave proliferation risks.

It is extremely concerning that the Agency is still not in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. We call on Iran to resume the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and to ratify it, to enable the Agency to provide credible assurances on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The EU recalls that the current global verification standard is based on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement combined with an Additional Protocol. We stress that the implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under Article 39 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which cannot be modified or suspended unilaterally. It is unacceptable that Iran's response to the Agency indicates its unwillingness to work with the Agency to address the issue of new nuclear facilities for which a decision to construct had been taken, such as the planned IR-360 reactor and the Hormoz nuclear power plants.

We share the DG's serious concern that Iran has unilaterally stopped implementing the March Joint Statement for the past three reporting periods, and his questioning of Iran's continued commitment [to its implementation].

We also echo the Director General's concerns about public statements made in Iran as expressed in the report regarding its technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, which add to the urgency for Iran to engage in a constructive and meaningful manner to enable the Agency to confirm the correctness and completeness of its safeguards declarations.

In light of the Agency's assessment in GOV/2024/8, the EU expects Iran to address without further delay:

• the outstanding safeguards issues in relation to Turquzabad and Varamin, including informing the Agency of the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment ;
• any question asked by the Agency in the context of its 'further consideration" of the issue of nuclear material sent from JHL to UCF for dissolution;
• the legal obligation to implement modified Code 3.1.
• the de-designations of experienced Agency inspectors.
• access to the data of installed surveillance cameras.

To conclude, the EU urges Iran to work with the Agency swiftly and substantially, towards the fulfillment of its commitments. It remains essential and urgent that Iran delivers on safeguards obligations and implements the actions specified in the November 2022 resolution. We expect rapid and tangible progress and we are determined to support further action by the Board accordingly.

With this, the EU takes note of the report, looks forward to the Director General continuing to report to the Board, and requests that this report be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

[1]North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.