EU Statement on Cluster I (nuclear disarmament) as delivered at the First Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the[...]

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement:North Macedonia^*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina,^* Iceland⁺ and San Marino.

We have outlined EU's approach for the 11^th review cycle in the general statement. The EU strongly supports all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote comprehensive, balanced, and substantive full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT and commitments during the previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security.

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

The EU condemns Russia's actions and threats to use nuclear force in its illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. We also wish to recall that last year - on 3 January 2022, Russia signed up to the joint statement by the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States - reaffirming, inter alia, that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Furthermore, it reiterated this commitment in a 22 March Joint Statement with China. We call upon Russia to respect the commitments contained therein.

We express our concern over Russia's announcement of its readiness to conduct a nuclear test, and we call on Russia to fully respect its obligations as a State party to the CTBTand to maintain adherence to its moratorium on nuclear tests.

Russia has blatantly violated its commitments to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. We recall that Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State in 1994, having returned Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia and having received security guarantees. There is no doubt that Ukraine is in full compliance with its obligations under the NPT. The loss of credibility of a nuclear weapon state that is not respecting its security assurances undermines the NPT and the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

In the same vein, the EU condemns the announcement by Russia on 25 March of its intention to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, against the commitment Belarus made in the Budapest Memorandum "to eliminate all nuclear weapons from [its] territory". The deletion of Belarus' declared stance as a non-nuclear territory from the revised constitution adopted last year is yet another development of concern. These steps escalate an already tense situation and thus undermine international peace and security. Belarus, despite its involvement in Russia's war of aggression, can however still make the choice to decline to further host Russian nuclear weapons. We therefore call on the Belarus authorities to put an immediate stop to their support of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and reverse any decision that would contribute to heightening existing tensions in the region.

Mr. Chair,

EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

The reduction of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals under the New START Treaty, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism, contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of deployed nuclear weapons. The EU is deeply concerned about Russia's purported suspension of the New START Treaty. We call on Russia to immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations, including by facilitating New START inspections on Russian territory, and by returning to participation in the Treaty's implementation body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Recalling the obligations for all nuclear-weapon States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU recalls Action 5 of the NPT 2010 Action Plan, which inter alia calls upon nuclear-weapons States to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence. The EU strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their arsenals including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons and to pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction and verification, laying the ground for even more robust and ambitious future arms control agreements and reporting. In this regard, the EU acknowledges the efforts by some nuclear-weapon States, including France, to demonstrate increased transparency on their doctrines and the nuclear weapons they possess and calls on others to do likewise.

Given the rapid and extensive build-up of China's nuclear arsenal, we call on China to join future arms control agreements and to respond positively to calls for an arms control dialogue as a first step. We urge China to immediately take measures to improve the transparency of its nuclear weapons and doctrine, to refrain from further build-up, which is not in line with its commitments under the NPT, and pursue risk reduction measures.

Mr. Chair,

The EU highlights also the following issues:

- its support for intensified dialogue, including on strategic stability, increased transparency and confidence building measures by the nuclear-weapon States to promote further progress in disarmament. In this regard, the EU acknowledges the outcome of the December 2021 Paris P5 conference;

- the benefits of concrete work on strategic and nuclear risk reduction, and therefore the urgent need for all States concerned to discuss, agree and implement practical measures to that end;

- the value of multilateral cooperation advancing nuclear disarmament verification. We will continue to support the actions taken by a number of States, including EU Member States, to consider the role of nuclear verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and support further efforts in all relevant fora, including the GGE, the Quad nuclear verification partnership, the international partnership for nuclear disarmament verification (IPNDV) format, and the NuDiVe initiative. While verification is not an end in itself, further development of the multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities would assist in the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons;

- its call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. We support the start of the negotiations in accordance with document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. Pending a future FMCT in force, the EU calls on China andall other States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. The EU has submitted a working paper in this regard;

- the need to promote universal adherence to and the entry into force of the CTBT, and that to this end all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex 2, need to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, we call on all States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We reiterate our full confidence in the CTBT's verification regime, which the EU supports financially, and which has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable data that will help to deter non-compliance with the Treaty once it enters into force.

The EU stresses the need to renew multilateral efforts and revitalize multilateral negotiating bodies, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, looking in this regard into enhancing the organization of its work as well as its future enlargement. We reject Russia's politically motivated approach to block the participation of UN Member States, international organisations and non-governmental organisations in international fora and processes, including the Conference on Disarmament.

The EU recognises the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear-weapon States as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. Negative security assurances can be an important confidence building measure which can strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, contribute to nuclear disarmament and enhance regional and global security, in line with the goals and objectives of the NPT. We stress the importance of continued reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their existing security assurances noted by relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

The EU supports disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the European network of independent think tanks, is contributing with various activities.

The EU believes it is important to integrate gender perspectives into discussions across the three pillars of the NPT. Therefore, it fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men throughout the NPT review cycle.

In conclusion, the EU reiterates its commitment to contribute actively to this review cycle and to the work of the Preparatory Committee with relevant Working Papers. We will take an active and constructive approach to the ongoing discussions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair

*Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.+Iceland is a member of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.

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