EU Statement at IAEA Board of Governors on Nuclear Security Review 2023 (6-10 March 2023)

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EU Statement at IAEA Board of Governors on Nuclear Security Review 2023 (6-10 March 2023)

07.03.2023 Press and information team of the Delegation to UN and OSCE in Vienna

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia^*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine^*, the Republic of Moldova^*, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, Georgia, Iceland⁺, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺ and San Marino.

We commend Director General Grossi and the IAEA Secretariat for the initiative to put forward the Nuclear Security Review 2023, which provides valuable and insightful information on global trends in 2022 and Agency priorities in 2023.

The EU affirms the central role of the IAEA in promoting, sustaining and strengthening the global nuclear security architecture. While the sole responsibility for nuclear security rests with a State and its competent national authorities, the Agency can make valuable contributions in response to high demand by Member States in building capacities, developing guidelines, and facilitating national coordination as well as regional and international cooperation. In this regard, the EU is pleased that the large majority of countries voted in favour of the Nuclear Security Resolution at last year's General Conference.

Ahead of the 2024 International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS), we must sustain our efforts to strengthen nuclear security and nuclear security culture that is essential for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

We encourage the Agency to continue promoting the universalisation and implementation of international instruments in nuclear security. We call on all IAEA Member States to accede to the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and adhere to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its two supplementary Guidance documents. Last year, the EU contributed to the successful review meeting of the A/CPPNM and co-sponsored the 15^th-anniversary event of ICSANT.

Chair,

In a digitalised world, cybersecurity has become an increasingly pressing issue to ensure nuclear security. We acknowledge the Agency's activities aimed, in the framework of an enhanced security culture, at raising awareness of cyber-attacks and their potential impact, strengthening computer security and promoting international exchange between experts and policy-makers. We welcome the upcoming International Conference on Computer Security in the Nuclear World: Security for Safety, to be held in Vienna in June 2023.

We underline the need for timely, reliable and sufficient resources for the Agency to implement its nuclear security activities, including from the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) and Regular Budget. The EU welcomes the organisation of donor meetings by the Secretariat and encourages further coordination to respond to the needs expressed by the IAEA Member States. We note with satisfaction that the Agency's rate of annual expenditure set against revenue of NSF funds increased significantly in 2022. Implementing a Results-Based Management policy is a top priority to be able to plan, implement and resource the full range of nuclear security activities as efficiently as possible, without duplication.

The EU and its Member States remain major donors to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and encourage all IAEA Member States to support it. The latest EU Council Decision, worth nearly €12 million, helps the IAEA provide comprehensive capacity-building assistance to third countries and also supports the IAEA Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme, which deserves our full attention on International Women's Day. €2 million has been reallocated to support the IAEA activities in Ukraine, including the January expert missions to establish a permanent IAEA presence in the five major nuclear facilities in Ukraine. This important deployment will require additional funds.

The EU deeply deplores that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues to deliberately put at risk the physical integrity of Ukraine's nuclear facilities and the nuclear material stored at the sites. It continues to heighten the risk of terrorist access to nuclear material and facilities, of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and related technologies, as well as of sabotage of nuclear material or nuclear facilities. It has been one year since the Russian troops damaged and looted the Chornobyl laboratory containing highly radioactive material. We continue to express particular concern for the potential risk caused by radioactive sources out of regulatory control. This is very serious and worrying, not least in light of our collective commitments to uphold and strengthen the nuclear security infrastructure and ensure the universal implementation of international instruments. We support the Director General's efforts to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant with the objective to preserve nuclear safety and security of the ZNPP at all times, whether physical systems and structures or human and organizational factors.

Chair,

The EU commends the IAEA for its work to assist Member States in reviewing their nuclear security regimes and identify areas where they need to be strengthened, including through Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs). We support the efforts made by the Agency to provide support to the Member States for enhancing their physical protection regimes and their legislative and regulatory frameworks and for facing emerging threats.

We believe the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) continues to serve as a valuable resource in exchanging information, and we encourage Member States to report, voluntarily and in a timely manner, incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

We welcome the IAEA's efforts to respond to Member States' requests and address the challenges raised by the nuclear safety and security interface. We look forward to the forthcoming joint publication on this topic by the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec) and the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG). We call on the Agency to continue bringing safety and security together in various relevant areas, such as transport and training, among others.

The EU and its Member States support the IAEA's work related to the nuclear security of small modular reactors (SMRs), focusing particularly on the security by design aspects for nuclear installations to ensure that security guidance and their implications are taken into account for protection against insider threats as well as external threats.

The EU and its Member States continue to monitor the establishment of the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC) at the Agency's Seibersdorf laboratories and note with satisfaction that it is scheduled to be operational at the end of 2023. The EU recalls that it attaches great importance to avoiding duplication with existing resources within the Agency and ensuring complementarity with training opportunities offered in Member States and Nuclear Security Support Centres. Accordingly, we fully support the ongoing agreements between the Agency and the European Commission, including with the European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA), their cooperation in capacity building and global outreach in nuclear forensics, and their commitment to ensuring synergies through sharing information and developing joint activities.

The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative also contributes to strengthening nuclear security by mitigating CBRN risks and strengthening all-hazards security governance in 64 partner countries. The EU's support is provided to a wide range of activities, including needs and risk assessments, national and regional action plans, capacity building, legal framework reviews, table top and real-time field exercises including cross-border exercises, exchange of best practices and lessons learnt and drafting of manuals and guides such as the Prosecutor's Guide to Radiological and Nuclear Crimes.

We welcome the work undertaken by the Secretariat to assess whether the IAEA's nuclear security guidance sufficiently addresses the security risks and implications posed by armed attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes. We look forward to receiving further information about this work and possible progress.

With these comments, Chair, the EU takes note of the Nuclear Security Review 2022 as contained in GOV/2023/4.

Thank you, Chair.

*Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.