ISPI - Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale

04/12/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 04/13/2024 17:00

More Military Cooperation in Sight for the US, Japan and the Philippines

On the 10 and 11 of April, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines convened in a summit in Washington to explore ways for strengthening their strategic cooperation. President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. engaged in both trilateral and bilateral discussions to strategize the implementation of their enhanced partnership in the Indo-Pacific, whose main focus is to counter China's growing assertiveness and influence in the region.

Such minilateral forums are increasingly common for the United States, which has established numerous partnerships and frameworks for cooperation as part of its efforts to bolster its presence in the Indo-Pacific and mitigate overreliance on China - namely the Quad and AUKUS. The ongoing concern over Taiwan and the potential for a Chinese incursion is a recurring topic of discussion in both Washington and Tokyo. Meanwhile, in the past years, the Philippines have been struggling to face off repeated incursions by Chinese vessels into its territorial waters in theSouth China Sea. Unified by concerns around China's perceived assertiveness, the countries have recognized the need of stronger cooperation in order to counterbalance China's ambitions and uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, despite the leaders' portrayal of the summit as a successful endeavour, domestic considerations and interests persist, which could potentially undermine the effectiveness of the agreements reached.

What has been agreed upon?

The range of topics touched during the trilateral meeting was quite broad, ranging from infrastructure and critical materials to strengthening security cooperation. In their joint statement, the three leaders asserted that the US-Japan-Philippines cooperation is aimed at securing a "connected, prosperous, secure, inclusive, and resilient" Indo-Pacific. Promoting an inclusive and sustainable economic growth for all in the region is mentioned as a key objective, while on the other hand the three counties reiterate their opposition to economic coercion. De-risking is front and center in such a strategy of economic resilience as the trilateral cooperation will be investing in "resilient, reliable, and diversified supply chains" along the lines traced by IPEF, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, launched in 2022 by Biden to reshape supply chains among like-minded democracies in the region. In this spirit the three countries have launched the so-called "Luzon corridor", as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) - declared in 2022 to fund infrastructure projects by the G7 - which will improve critical infrastructures in the northern island of the Philippines (like rails and ports) and foster the development of strategic sectors. Industrial and academic cooperation will be centered around cutting-edge and emerging technologies like semiconductors or clean energy.

Yet, as anticipated, an important section of the statement was devoted to security coordination: while affirming their commitment to the principles of the freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as the importance of respecting the sovereign rights of states, the three countries expressed concerns for China's activities against Filipino positions in the South China Sea and for its provocations around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands. They also underlined the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. On the back of these considerations, they announced the establishment of a "trilateral maritime dialogue to enhance coordination and collective responses to promote maritime cooperation", which will materialize in periodical joint naval exercises open to like-minded countries like Australia. The document reflects a growing trend among East Asian allies of the US to strengthen their mutual ties to build a multilayered defense network and upgrade deterrence against security challenges, like China's military presence in the region.

Before the trilateral meeting, Biden had a separate conversation with both Kishida and Marcos Jr. The Japanese prime minister was the first head of government from Tokyo in 9 years to carry out a state visit to Washington, an occasion that has been duly emphasized by Kishida with a speech to the joint session of the US Congress. The core tenet of the Japan's mission has been to underline its reliability as a global partner for the US, focused not just on maintaining stability and security in its own Indo-Pacific region, but also to support the free and open international rule-based order much beyond Japanese traditional geographic scope. To substantiate this attitude, Japan and the US have reached about 70 agreements that aim at pushing their relationship forward by enhancing cooperation in areas such as defense, space, economic security, artificial intelligence, or energy. Particularly noteworthy are the intentions to reshape and upgrade the command structure of the US military presence in Japan, and the commitment to advance defense industrial co-development, co-production and co-sustainment, which signal the underlying strategic trust and political goodwill that both leaders deem as the foundation for their alliance.

In turn, the bilateral meeting between President Biden and Marcos Jr. on the 11th built upon the security assurances discussed in the trilateral session. The Philippines' primary concern is to establish a credible deterrent to discourage Chinese encroachments into its territorial waters. President Biden has promised that the United States will defend the Philippines from attacks in the SCS - indeed the two countries are bound by a Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1951. Under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the US already has access to 9 military bases in the Philippines and has there allocated over $100 million for infrastructure projects. Additionally, and plans are underway to invest in similar endeavours. The US has also committed to providing funds to enhance the country's capacity for humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. On the economic front, beyond the establishment of the Luzon Economic Corridor - the first in the Indo-Pacific region -, the US is keen on investing in projects to facilitate the Philippines' transition to a green and digital economy through supply chain modernization. Of particular interest to Washington is the possibility to develop a semiconductor industrial base in the Philippines, as well as plants to process critical raw materials such as nickel and cobalt.

What to expect after the Summit?

The trilateral summit, rather than a breakthrough for the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, should be better understood as the concrete formalization of trends that were already in place. For instance, it was last year when the US, Japan and the Philippines held their first joint naval exercises in the South China Sea, which are now expected to become more recurring. Enhancing interoperability will be key to strengthen their deterrence against unilateral changes to the status quo in the Indo-Pacific, which the three countries are afraid China could be willing to pursue. Credibility will also be an essential part of the success of such a deterrence strategy. Thus, it is likely that we will observe increasing political coordination between the three countries when it comes to other security topics as well: it's no coincidence then if these same days Japan has openly been mentioned by US, UK, and Australian defence ministers as a possible partner for AUKUS, the military technology alliance that has tied together the three English-speaking countries since 2021.

However, under the surface of unity and steadfastness, the strategic outlooks of the US, Japan and the Philippines may not be as converging as they seem at first glance. The Philippines has been a much sought-after partner for Washington and Tokyo, as it completes that "first island chain" that would constrain Chinese military deployment close to its own shore and within the South and East China Sea. Tensions have been running high between Manila and Beijing since Marcos Jr. came into power in 2022 and the US and Japan took advantage of this increasing hostility to invite the Southeast Asian nation into the new trilateral format. Yet, the core foreign policy concerns of the Philippines remain the defence of its national waters in the South China Sea, and it is up for debate whether Manila believes that it can commit to defend areas secondary to its own strategic interests. For instance, it is doubtful whether an economically small and militarily underdeveloped country like the Philippines may be willing to put its full weight behind the defence of the Senkaku islands, which in Manila may be perceived as more of a Japanese-US concern. The internal sphere also plays an important role the Philippines public opinion might have welcomed the rekindling of ties with Washington and the increased partnership with Tokyo, but China remains an important economic partner for the islands. Not necessarily Marcos will have the political support necessary to face off Beijing in a bid to protect the Senkaku Island or Taiwan. Certain political sphere in the Philippines is also close to China and are already starting to criticize Marcos' stance vis-a-vis Beijing. For example, previous president Roderigo Duterte has been vocal in stressing how, under his mandate, thanks to his policy of appeasement toward China no clashes of such entity had happened in the SCS and how Marcos risks hurting the country's interests by siding so starkly with US. In addition, constitutional restraints might limit the military involvement of foreign countries in the Philippines territories. The Philippines must be careful in striking a balance between ensuring that their territorial rights are respected - through increased cooperation with the US and Japan for example - while at the same time avoid antagonizing China and risk further economic and military repercussions.

Meanwhile, Japan has come to great length to prove its commitment to uphold the stability of the regional and global order. Its support to Ukraine against the Russian aggression serves as a testimony, underpinned by the conviction that whether the rule-based order breaks down in Europe, it will just be about time before it breaks down in the Indo-Pacific as well. Yet, the self-proclaimed global partnership between Japan and the US faces important domestic challenges. First, the constitutional constraints on the overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which may take place only under specific circumstances, put a heavy burden on Japan and limit its capacity to contribute to the new trilateral format. Also, many legal restrictions on the export of the military equipment needed to modernize the Filipino military remain in place. Then, there is a domestic dimension to it, as Komeito (the Buddhist-inspired junior coalition partner of the ruling LDP) has long held a deep-seated reluctance to relax rules on Japanese military development while the people of Okinawa have long been hostile to the expansion of military bases in the southern prefecture of Japan. These are matters of internal politics: popular sentiment can change, laws can redraw the limits of what SDFs are entitled to do, and courts can strengthen central government jurisdiction over defence affairs at the expense of local authorities. But it takes time and political will.

What really was a stake during the trilateral summit was the formalization of a political coordination mechanism that, building upon a common understanding of the regional security environment, ensure policy continuity despite turbulent and radical changes that could take place in the region or within the three countries. It is also quite likely that Trump was on everyone's mind.