EUISS - European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUISS - European Union Institute for Security Studies
03/11/2025 | Press release | Archived content
Turning money into action: What next steps for European defence
Amidst fears of American abandonment of Ukraine and Europe, EU leaders met on 6 March for a special summit on European defence. They endorsed President Von der Leyen's 'ReArm Europe' plan which aims to unlock up to €800 billion for defence. The plan involves five main instruments: activating the national escape clause allowing Member States to remove defence spending from the excess deficit procedure; a new €150 billion loan instrument for common defence investment; making it possible for Member States to redirect cohesion funds towards defence; enhancing the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB); and mobilising private financing for the defence industry.
A strong European defence requires a ramp-up of spending. However, this money must be turned into concrete capabilities.
The plan's focus on money and financing reflects the consensus reached within the EU on the necessary first step: a strong European defence requires a ramp-up of spending. However, this money must be turned into concrete capabilities. European countries already far outspend Russia in total defence spending - although Russia tends to get more bang for its bucks in purchasing power terms. To be truly able to defend themselves, European states must turn their (considerable) resources into a formidable and integrated fighting force. They must also ask themselves whether they can still rely on American weapons and assets.
Derisking from Washington?
For decades, US-made weapons served to cement security guarantees offered by Washington: integrating them within European armed forces was seen as a way to strengthen interoperability and deepen America's commitment to defending its allies. Last week, however, they became a tool of weaponised interdependence: the US showed that it could, for coercive purposes, disable its systems, thereby severely impairing another state's ability to fight. It is no longer impossible to imagine the Trump presidency blocking arms sales or deactivating weapons systems used by European allies as part of a grand bargain with Putin.
This is a problem given the European reliance on the US defence industry. On the one hand, this is economic dependency: Washington is the largest provider of Europe's defence imports (although the actual figure is contested). On the other, it is operational dependency: European armies rely on specific US assets, known as 'strategic enablers', to perform their missions - such as transporting troops, providing intelligence and surveillance, protecting the operational theatre, and securing communications against electronic warfare and cyberattacks.
It is no longer impossible to imagine the Trump presidency blocking arms sales or deactivating weapons systems used by European allies as part of a grand bargain with Putin.
Major platforms such as the F-35 exemplify this dependency: this fifth-generation combat aircraft, 150 of which are currently owned by non-US NATO allies, relies on constant data integration and software updates from the US. If Washington wanted, it could make it hard if not impossible for these jets to fly.
Recent events have given a new twist to the old 'de-risking' debate: until now, Europeans have focused on reducing dependencies on China and Russia in their supply chains. Now, they might need to include the US in their list of untrustworthy vendors. However, this is not going to be easy: European armies are built for interoperability with the US armed forces, and national defence industries are deeply integrated with counterparts across the Atlantic.
From the special summit to the White Paper: enabling European defence
As the EU develops the White Paper on the Future of European Defence, it will need to address the new reality of transatlantic relations. While Europe cannot simply switch off its dependencies on America, it can take steps to manage the risks.
The development of strategic enablers would be an excellent starting point. The EU should propose to use the new funding instruments to develop European-wide enablers that are necessary to deter or successfully fight Russia without the US. Some of these capabilities could be achieved relatively quickly: according to a recent survey of defence experts, Europe can achieve self-sufficiency within five years in areas such as battlefield command and control (C2), long-range strikes and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD). Other capabilities, such as space-based intelligence, will require more time. But, with concerns emerging over the reliability of Starlink, it could be worth investing EU money in these long-term projects as well.
While Europe cannot simply switch off its dependencies on America, it can take steps to manage the risks.
In addition to enhancing European deterrence, focusing on replacing US-provided enablers would have multiple benefits. It would show that EU-level spending can complement the efforts of Member States. It would alleviate concerns about centralisation of power away from national capitals, who would still be able to invest in national capabilities. Spending on collective enablers would open the door for participation by non-EU Member States, including Ukraine but also the UK, Norway and others (for instance, in exchange for contributions to the joint fund). Moreover, this would facilitate the integration of Ukraine's expertise on defence innovation, AI-drone integration, industrial production and air defences into European defence.
Private capital should be integrated as well - for instance, in setting up public-private partnerships to fund defence innovation. The market has already understood the direction of travel: since Trump's inauguration, shares in Europe's largest defence groups have surged by almost 40%, anticipating a rapid increase in autonomous European defence spending. The EU must harness this momentum - both in the market and in political will - to take decisive action.
The White Paper will not a priori impede the continuation of defence ties with the United States if they serve the EU's interest. However, the central questions guiding every proposal should be: what makes Europe safer? What enables us to best defend the continent from external threats? What could turn into a liability in the future? Strategic clarity about the present and the future must guide Europe's actions.