Speech DSG Fries CSIS: “Two years after the Russian aggression against Ukraine: charting the path for the EU defense agenda”

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Speech DSG Fries CSIS: "Two years after the Russian aggression against Ukraine: charting the path for the EU defense agenda"

04.03.2024

Good morning,

I would like to start by thanking the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for the kind invitation - and in particular, Max Bergmann for the organisation of the event.

I am pleased to speak before you today in Washington two years after the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

It is a grim anniversary but also an occasion to look at what the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have done together and discuss the challenges both sides of the Atlantic will have to face together over the next months.

First remark: the war in Ukraine has been a turning point for European defence

The EU has brought a quick, strong and united response to the Russian invasion.

The EU is Ukraine's largest financial supporter. 88 billion EUR so far. With 50 billion EUR in addition agreed last month that, between now and 2027,will help Ukraine keep notably its administration running, pay salaries and pensions. The EU has adopted so far 13 sanctions packages hurting considerably the Russian economy. We also managed to reduce drastically our energy dependency on Russia. We welcomed more than 4 million Ukrainian refugees on EU's territory. We opened the way for Ukraine's accession to the EU. And I could go on.

But it is in security and defence that the EU has surprised the most. Where the Union has been very bold, breaking long-standing taboos.

For the first time indeed, the Union has financed the delivery of weapons to a country at war using the European Peace Facility. This new instrument has proven to be a game changer by encouraging Member States to give more equipment to Ukraine. 28 billion EUR of military assistance so far, deliveredthrough the European Peace Facility and bilateral support. This figure is expected to increase with more than 20 billion EUR already planned as deliveries for Ukraine in 2024.

In parallel, the EU has launched its largest military mission in its history to train the Ukrainian army. The EU will have trained 60.000 soldiers by this summer.

Our support to Ukraine takes place in a broader context where the EU wants to be a more efficient and credible security provider. For this, we adopted two years ago a strategic doctrine - we call it the EU's strategic compass. In short, a common threat analysis and a roadmap with 80 concrete actions and timelines.

Over the last four years, we launched seven crisis management operations. For instance, in Moldova, in Armenia or in the Gulf of Guinea. Last illustration in the Red Sea where maritime security has significantly deteriorated following Houthis attacks. Two weeks ago, the EU launched a new maritime operation to safeguard freedom of navigation and protect merchant shipping. It will cooperate with other international partners, in particular Operation Prosperity Guardian led by the US.

This new assertive position has led to a change of perception across the Atlantic, leading to more US-EU cooperation. Four concrete examples:

• in 2022, we launched a security and defence dialogue together. We are cooperating on a wide range of issues, such as cyber, space or military mobility. For instance, the US joined our EU project to move more easily troops and equipment across Europe.
• last year, the US Department of Defence and the European Defence Agency signed a long awaited cooperation agreement.
• we conducted for the first time last year a joint naval military exercise in the Indian Ocean.
• the EU takes part in the capability coalitions set up under the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group. It helps us to coordinate our own military assistance with all partners of Ukraine.

But we need to be lucid, a lot remains to be done. This leads me to my second remark: the common challenges we need to face together.

2024 is a year of key electionswhere 2 billion people will vote in more than 50 countries - almost half the world's adult population. These include elections in several EU Member States, European elections in June, and in the United States in November. Their outcomes may change the political and strategic outlook for the years to come.

Looking ahead, I see three priorities for the EU:

Our first top priority is to continue supporting Ukraine as long as it takes andwhatever it takes.

Ukraineis fighting for its survival as an independent state and for its own freedom. It is an existential threat for Ukraine. But also for Europe.We will continue to do our share. In addition to the recent 50 billion EUR pledge, we are working on a new dedicated financial envelope - a Ukraine Assistance Fund - to sustain military support to Ukraine with a first tranche of 5 billion EUR. I hope that a deal will be made at the next European Council at the end of this month.

We are also closely following what is happening in the Congress and we hope that the US will be able to do the same.

An agreement on our new EU military assistance for Ukraine will open the way for the EU to sign with Ukraine an agreement on security commitments. Similarly to what other G7 members have started to do.

Moreover, Ukraine has a lot of things to teach us. Its industrial base had to shift to a war economy model when we have to make EU countries "more war capable". This is why, for instance, we will open an EU office for defence innovation in Kyiv, enabling us to draw on Ukraine's battlefield experience and expertise.Second priority: we need to help our defence industry produce more. There is no other solution if we look at the magnitude of the defence needs for Ukraine but also for our Member States that need to replenish their stocks and acquire new equipment.

When it comes to Europe, the good news is that, after 30 years of under-investments, we have started to catch up. Defence budgets in the EU are 40% higher than a decade ago and we need to accelerate.

But spending more does not automatically mean spending better. We are not cooperating enough among Europeans. The good answer should not be "doing more alone" but "better together".

We have already taken many steps to support this objective, using the EU budget to co-finance defence research, ramp-up ammunition production and even encourage joint procurement. But we need to go the extra mile.

Tomorrow, the Commission and the High Representative will present the first European Defence Industrial Strategy with concrete proposals to spend more, better, together and European. In short, we want to be Defence Ready.

Among the proposals:

• we will offer to increase the production capacity of the European defence industry beyond ammunition and missiles.
• we will also encourage Member States to jointly procure. This will offer more interoperability and more predictability to the industry.
• we will alsostrengthen the resilience of our supply chains.

We also need to spend more European. Similarly to President Biden's arguments that more support to Ukraine would also benefit US defence companies, EU taxpayer money needs to help create jobs in Europe as well. But I want to be clear: it is not only about European companies. It does not exclude US companies that are based in the EU and meet security conditions. This is similar to other EU instruments like the European Defence Fund where, for instance, half of the projects financed in 2021 and 2022 involve participants based in the EU and controlled by a partner country.

I believe it is important to address misperceptions and possible misunderstanding. If we want European states to be more credible defence actors and increase their defence budgets - and I think this is exactly what the US is asking Europeans to do, it also means that we need to produce more in Europe.

It can only positively contribute to both European and Transatlantic security and ultimately to a better burden sharing within NATO.

This leads me to my third priority: strengthening EU-NATO partnership.

Our cooperation with NATO is stronger than ever. Since the start of the Russian invasion, the EU and NATO have acted in full complementarity: with NATO focusing on the collective defence of its Allies and the EU mobilizing a wide set of instruments to weaken Russia and support Ukraine, for instance on delivering weapons to Kyiv - which was, for understandable reasons, impossible for NATO as such.

With 23 EU Member States now members of Atlantic Alliance, we want to continue strengthening the European pillar of NATO. That will make the Alliance stronger.

I would also like to remind what is obvious. Our member States have a single set of forces: a capability developed and procured thanks to the EU financial support can be used by our Member States in any frameworks they deem appropriate - EU, NATO, UN or others.

But now, what can we do more?

First example, we can reinforce interoperability. One illustration: the Dutch-German brigade uses the same type of howitzer. But the Dutch have a certain type of ammunition for their howitzer; the Germans have a certain type of ammunition for theirs; and they are not interoperable. They cannot use each other's ammunition. This is an issue of standardisation. What the EU can do is to encourage Member States and private companies to use existing standards. Here, I want to be clear: the EU does not develop military standards. This is done within NATO.Another example, military mobility. An obvious domain of cooperation where we could do more. So far, we have invested 1.7 billion EUR to upgrade transport infrastructure. We are also adapting our regulations. We do this in close consultation with NATO taking into account the needs of the Alliance when programming our instruments.

We are also expanding our cooperation on emerging and disruptive technologies, space, fight against disinformation and the resilience of our critical infrastructures.

We hope that the Washington Summit in July will offer an opportunity for the US to support the EU efforts I have just described.

To conclude, the European Union has often been seen from this side of the Atlantic above all as a large economic market. But I think that now we are progressively becoming a security actor as well, taking more responsibility for our own security - even if I am well aware that we still have a lot of progress to make.

Regardless of the outcomes of the next US elections, we will stay the course. We will continue to invest for our own defence because it is simply our interest and our strategic responsibility. And it is by doing so that the EU will be seen as a better partner by the US and contribute to a stronger NATO./.