Accident to the plane Robin DR400 registered F-BXEU and the microlight Alpi Aviation Pioneer300 identified 37AHH on 10/10/2020 at Loches

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In the afternoon of 10 October 2020, the pilot of F-BXEU, accompanied by two passengers and the pilot of 37AHH, accompanied by one passenger took off at around 15:20, at an interval of approximately five minutes, from Poitiers airport and Châtellerault aerodrome respectively for revenue flights of around two hours over the Loire châteaux region. The flight on F-BXEU had been purchased a few months previously from ASPTT and the flight on 37AHH had been purchased from Silvair Services.

At 15:39, the pilot of F-BXEU, who until this point had been in contact with Poitiers flight information, contacted the Paris Flight Information Centre (FIC) (Paris information). The agent in position did not reply to this message. The pilot of F-BXEU did not subsequently call back
Paris information.

The two aircraft followed a route which brought them overhead several Loire châteaux.

At 15:56, both F-BXEU and 37AHH flew overhead Chaumont-sur-Loire château. The pilot of F-BXEU flew overhead the château in a straight line at an altitude of around 1,150 ft while the pilot of 37AHH flew a full circle over the château at 1,500 ft. The two aircraft found themselves on a converging path, and closed in to a horizontal distance of less than 300 m before flying away from each other. A few seconds later, the pilot of 37AHH contacted Paris information who took him into account and identified him on the radar. The two aircraft continued their routes and ultimately headed south to return to their respective bases.

At 16:43, the pilot of 37AHH, who was approaching the Poitiers Flight Information Sector (FIS), left the Paris information frequency. He started the overflight of Loches château west abeam of the town by flying a full left-hand circle and probably started a second one. At 16:44, the pilot of F-BXEU started the overflight of Loches château east abeam of the town by flying a full right-hand circle.

At 16:45, F-BXEU and 37AHH collided almost head-on with each other at an altitude of around 1,200 ft, south of Loches. Both aircraft lost a part of their left wing.

The pilot of 37AHH lost control of the microlight and the airframe parachute was activated. The microlight collided with the ground before catching fire. The pilot of F-BXEU lost control of the aeroplane which collided with the ground, in bramble bushes.

The investigation was able to show that the mid-air collision, which occurred in class G airspace (where the separation between aircraft principle is based on the "see and avoid" rule) was the consequence of a lack of visual contact between the two pilots whose attention was turned towards the flight over the Loches château. In this context, this investigation serves as a reminder of the importance for pilots, of contacting the air navigation services without delay in order to benefit from the flight information service, which is available over a large part of the French territory.

The investigation also revealed that the metal cables holding the safety parachute, supplied by Alpi Aviation during the investigation suffered failures under loads below the specifications given by the manufacturer. This seems to show that the correct deployment of an airframe parachute installed on a Pioneer 300 is not guaranteed.

The BEA issued two safety recommendations:

• one addressed to the manufacturer of the Pioneer 300, urging it to review the assembly of the airframe parachute system on this type of microlight;
• the other to EASA, to ensure the complete interoperability of the electronic conspicuity systems that it promotes in the framework of the European Plan for Aviation Safety, with the aim of preventing mid-air collisions.

The BEA issues 2 safety recommendations:

- Recommendation FRAN 2023-005/ Pioneer 300 airframe parachute:

The BEA recommends that:

- whereas the 37AHH airframe parachute was activated before the collision with the ground but did not deploy correctly;
- whereas the examination of the 37AHH parachute showed that three of the four cables connecting the parachute to the structure of the microlight suffered a similar failure;
- whereas the tensile tests carried out on new cables supplied by the manufacturer systematically reproduced this failure at loads well below the specifications, making it impossible to guarantee correct deployment of the parachute;
- whereas the design of the cable loops used to assemble the parachute system on the microlight does not comply with European standards and does not guarantee that they can withstand the specified loads;

Alpi Aviation review the assembly of the cables connecting the airframe parachute to the structure of the Pioneer 300s already delivered and in production to ensure that this system correctly complies with the given specifications.

- Recommendation FRAN 2023-006/ Interoperability of traffic detection systems:

The BEA recommends that:

- whereaselectronic conspicuity systems are a promising solution to supplement the current safety principles for the avoidance of mid-air collisions;
- whereasEASA has shown an interest in the development of these electronic conspicuity systems by insisting on their interoperability;
- whereasthe vast majority of electronic conspicuity systems developed in recent years guarantee "in signal" interoperability, but not "out signal" interoperability;
- whereasthe solutions developed so far, mostly using their own formats and frequencies, show that it is technically difficult to obtain "out signal" interoperability without the development of an exchange-format standard and the allocation of a dedicated aeronautical frequency;

EASA promote "out signal" interoperability of electronic conspicuity systems, for example through the development of an exchange-format standard and the allocation of a dedicated aeronautical frequency in order to promote safety.

The recommendations are being processed

The status of the recommendations is available at SRIS2: click here

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Note: in accordance with the provisions of Article 17.3 of Regulation No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, a safety recommendation in no case creates a presumption of fault or liability in an accident, serious incident or incident. The recipients of safety recommendations report to the issuing authority in charge of safety investigations, on the measures taken or being studied for their implementation, as provided for in Article 18 of the aforementioned regulation.

General information

Local date	10/10/2020
Responsible entity	France - BEA
Scope of Investigation	Full (Annex 13) type investigation
State or area of occurrence	Europe and North Atlantic - France - 37 Indre-et-Loire
Location	Loches
Human consequences	Fatal
Number of death	5
Aircraft consequences	Destroyed
Occurrence class	Accident
Occurence category	MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/ (near) midair collisions
File number	BEA2020-0451

Flight Information

Aircraft category	Fixed Wing - Aeroplane - Small Aeroplane - Small Aeroplane
Operator	France (ACB ASPTT POITIERS)
Manufacturer / Model	ROBIN - DR400
Aircraft Registration	F-BXEU
State of registry	France
Last departure point	France - LFBI (PIS): Poitiers Biard
Planned destination	France - LFBI (PIS): Poitiers Biard
Flight phase	Manoeuvring
Serial number	1023
Operator Type AG	Flying club/school
Operation Type	Non-Commercial Operations - Pleasure - Local

Second aircraft involved

Aircraft category	Fixed Wing - Ultralight/ Microlight - Fixed-wing
Operator
Manufacturer / Model	Alpi Aviation - Pioneer300
Aircraft Registration	37AHH
State of registry	France
Last departure point	France - LFCA : Chatellerault Targé
Planned destination	France - LFCA : Chatellerault Targé
Flight phase	Manoeuvring
Serial number
Operator Type AG
Operation Type	Unknown

BEA is the French air safety investigation authority for civil aviation. The sole objective of the investigation is to improve air safety. It is intended neither to apportion blame nor to assess responsiblity.

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